A Dangerous Attempt at Justification: The Question of Armed Bengali Groups in Northern Arakan

GAN/ Arakan (Rakhine State) May 7, 2024

Junta-backed Bengali Muslim militants surrendered to the AA (Photocredit)

On May 6, 2024, Maung Zarni, a pro-Rohingya movement activist and anti-Arakanese advocate, authored an article on the DVB (English platform) suggesting a potential justification for the arming of extremist elements within the Bengali Muslim community under the junta’s conscription program. Zarni is a highly controversial figure who identifies as a human rights activist, but his political stances, words, and actions are viewed as opportunistic and divisive within Arakan. He lacks broad recognition and is considered a problematic and disruptive presence in the affected community.

Zarni’s latest piece titled “What choice do Rohingya have?” advances several contentious points. He stated,

[“When the AA and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), officially rejected the Rohingya as indigenous co-residents of Arakan State, the Rohingya were compelled to reconsider their warming sentiments towards the AA.”]

This statement aims to challenge the complex political backdrop of the ‘Rohingya’ movement's claim to indigenous status. Individuals like Zarni and many other Bengali and pro-Bengali Rohingya activists advance problematic assertions such as, ‘the Arakan Kingdom was multi-ethnic and religious; therefore, the Rohingya are indigenous to the land.’ This type of political assertion poses an existential threat to existing Arakanese and other minority groups in the region, including Kaman Muslims. As indicated by colonial British sources, many individuals claiming to be ‘Rohingya’ are descendants of colonial migrants but rightfully claim citizenship under the names ‘Bengali’ or ‘Chittagonian.’

Hence, while acknowledging the presence of a small number of Muslim residents in pre-colonial Arakan, the ULA’s stance of ‘not recognizing the Rohingya name and indigenous status of the group’ is factually and morally justified.

Moreover, Zarni attempts to justify the junta’s arming of the Muslim community members with four key points: highlighting the military conscription program and the citizenship status of the Muslim community; referencing provocations such as Bengali Muslims asserting native status in Arakan, and unclear allusions to historical events such as the East India Company and its mercenaries during the Anglo-Burmese war; and finally, discussing the options for the remaining Bengali Muslim population within Arakan.

Zarni’s underlying justification narrative revolves around the notion that the ‘Bengali Muslim community is caught between the Myanmar junta and the Arakan Army (AA)’, thereby suggesting that Bengali extremists can arm themselves to protect against perceived threats without considering the negative consequences of such actions.

Firstly, it is inaccurate to suggest that Bengali people are trapped between two armed factions, as the AA’s historical relations and intentions towards the community differ significantly from those of the Myanmar junta. Additionally, in the Maungdaw and Buthidaung areas, there are more than two armed parties, including junta-backed extremist Bengali factions such as ARA, ARSA, and RSO.

Secondly, Zarni’s argument that armed Bengalis can protect themselves from external adversaries lacks rationality. Armed individuals without a centralized command and control system are prone to further divisions and crimes, leading to long-term insecurity and instability in the region, which serves only the interests of the Myanmar junta.

Thirdly, it is crucial to recognize that arming Bengali groups will only exacerbate insecurity within the community. Dominant actors like the ULA/AA have made it clear that they do not accept any armed group apart from the AA in Arakan. Therefore, contrary to Zarni’s assertions, the consequences of such actions will likely result in increased instability and insecurity in these areas.

In conclusion, based on the aforementioned factors, external actors like Maung Zarni should refrain from exacerbating sensitive situations on the ground. As indicated in his article, pro-Rohingya activists like him lead comfortable lives in foreign and developed countries and therefore should avoid inciting local innocent people to participate in future conflicts. Local community leaders are best positioned to navigate these complex issues.