New Government in Dhaka: Potentials for Better Relations with the Arakan Army

By Moe Satt, GAN

Shortread: Opinions                                                                          October 5, 2024

Chief Advisor of Bangladesh, Mohammad Yunus (Photocrd)

Bangladesh experienced one of its most politically unstable periods in recent history, with youth leaders and their movement achieving significant momentum in their demands for political reform. Although the initial crisis stemmed from an unfair quota system that favored the descendants of freedom fighters, the downfall of Sheikh Hasina’s regime was not entirely predictable. It suggests that the military may have played an indirect role in facilitating the removal of the former Prime Minister, indicating that the army remains a powerful force behind the scenes, exerting influence over the government in Dhaka.

Political shifts inevitably create winners and losers. In this case, the students, along with anti-Sheikh Hasina and anti-Awami League (AL) factions such as the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and various Islamic groups, have emerged as winners. On the other hand, pro-establishment forces and AL allies are facing significant threats, including arrests and imprisonment. Furthermore, the recent attacks on Hindu minorities and other indigenous groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts are not random acts of violence but appear to be deliberate. In recent days, deadly communal clashes have erupted between Bengali settlers, backed by the Bangladesh military, and indigenous communities, notably the Chakma, Marma, and Tripuri. Dissatisfaction and resentment over the failure of successive Bengali governments to implement the 1997 peace agreement have reached a breaking point, and this issue is likely to persist.

A more pressing foreign policy challenge facing the new regime in Dhaka is the issue of the Chittagonian Muslim refugees, who identify themselves as Rohingya. Some reports from Bangladesh estimate that the refugee population in Cox’s Bazar has exceeded 1.2 million, although this figure may be inflated to attract global attention. While the Yunus government in Dhaka may have innovative ideas for resolving the crisis, hardliners within the country’s military could act as obstacles to these worthwhile efforts. The first step for the authorities in Dhaka should be to reconsider their 'Nothing But Rohingya' (NBR) policy.

What is Dhaka’s NBR policy?

Understandably, the government in Dhaka has grown weary of hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees on its border for many years. The Chittagong coastal areas are, in fact, the ancestral lands of Chittagonian migrants from northern Arakan. In managing relations with the Arakan Army (AA), the Dhaka authorities must recognize that many other critical issues need to be addressed in collaboration with the AA. Therefore, policymakers in Dhaka should adopt a broader perspective on what they aim to achieve and how they plan to do so.

Currently, armed conflicts continue in Arakan, with the Myanmar junta desperately trying to maintain control over its last military camp, No-5 Border Guard Police Force (BGPF), near Maungdaw. Meanwhile, millions of people from all communities in Arakan are facing severe humanitarian challenges, including food shortages and a lack of basic supplies. However, the Dhaka authorities have blocked the provision of cross-border humanitarian assistance from the international community, revealing that Bangladesh is no longer championing humanitarian efforts.

Secondly, the deliberate support of Chittagonian militant groups by Bangladesh's security agencies, such as the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), is a dangerous policy. The Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO), now fully backed by the DGFI, has been launching attacks against the Arakan Army (AA) in border areas. The RSO, along with elements from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), frequently ambushes AA columns near the border and either retreats into Bangladesh or fires from within Bangladeshi territory. This policy should be halted by the DGFI. If the intention is to use the RSO as leverage in repatriation negotiations, it is a misguided strategy.

Instead, policymakers in Dhaka should focus on broader issues such as trade, border security, and improving socio-economic conditions for communities on both sides of the Naf River. Such an approach would create opportunities for better relations with the Arakan Army.