The Politics of Identity in the so-called "Rohingya Crisis"

GAN/ Arakan (Rakhine State) April 6, 2024

ARSA leader Ataullah abu Ammar Jununi (Photocredit)

On April 2, 2024, a Myanmar-born scholar and human rights activist named Maung Zarni wrote a commentary for FORSEA in response to the tweets of ULA/AA Chief Major General Twan Mrat Naing regarding the identity of the Muslim residents in Arakan (Rakhine state) whom he referred to as 'Bengali'. Zarni's piece was lengthy and began with an accusation such as, "On March 26, with his 31-word tweet on X (formerly Twitter), the leader of the Arakan Army Twan Mrat Naing revealed the genocidal nature of the increasingly powerful armed Rakhine nationalist movement." Zarni's tone was aggressive and emotional, which differed from what one would expect from a "scholar or educator."

He attempted to provide a brief history of the evolution of the so-called 'Rohingya', but he failed to delve deeply into the pre-colonial and colonial Muslim migration into the land of Arakan. Those seeking a more objective and logical understanding of these stories should consider the observations of well-known experts on Arakan, Burma, and Southeast Asian history, such as Dr. Jacques Leider.

Zarni also attempted to draw parallels between the Muslim issue in Arakan and the "Israel-Palestine Conflict" on the identity front, stating, "A chilling parallel between the way the Zionists construct their group identity, initially as 'Palestinians'." What observers like Zarni and others failed to understand about the "Rohingya crisis" in Arakan is not just the question of identity construction, but also the deeper distorted historical claims, population threats, and political motivations behind that 'identity' itself.

For the native 'Arakanese community' and other minority groups in Arakan, the term 'Rohingya' represents a political movement and the various motivations behind it pose an 'existential threat' to the indigenous identities and the future survival of Arakan itself.

In addition to the pragmatic harms caused by the 'Rohingya' identity, there is also a moral argument as to why indigenous communities have the right not to use or accept the term 'Rohingya'. Even though the 'Rohingya movement' largely revolves around demands for 'citizenship and human rights' to garner sympathy, attention, and resources from the UN and the Western international community, the deeper historical and political claims go beyond these parameters.

Firstly, the term 'Rohingya' only emerged in the 1950s and 1960s with the secessionist and armed movement of colonial Chittagongnian immigrants seeking to separate the so-called 'Mayu Frontier Area' (MFA) to join East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) or to create a separated Muslim area. Secondly, the 'Rohingya movement' is indirectly and partly connected with global Islamic extremist movements. Thirdly, there is a population threat from the refugee community that could potentially overwhelm native ethnic groups like the Rakhine, Mro, Khamei, Daingnet, etc. Fourthly, the distorted construction of the historical Rohingya identity is offensive and a threat to the identity of another community, particularly the native Arakanese (Rakhine) people.

ARSA attacking BGP in Maungdaw (Photo/ARSA)

While every individual or group has the right to self-identification in line with universal norms, the distorted and illogical historical claims and extreme political ambitions pose challenges for other communities in the region. Moreover, despite the presence of a small Muslim population in pre-colonial Arakan, 'Rohingya activists' fail to acknowledge the fact that the vast majority of the current Muslim population in Arakan are colonial and post-colonial settlers. Based on these grounds, the right not to recognize the term 'Rohingya' is justified.