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By GAN
Longread: Opinions March 24, 2025
As the Arakan Army’s national liberation revolutionary war within Arakan grows larger and more widespread, political attacks and criticisms from various sides, without the sound of gunfire, have also noticeably increased. Among these, one of the key issues is related to the ‘Paletwa region,’ which the Arakan Army initially captured on the Arakan battlefield. Around mid-June last year, the Arakan Army fully liberated the ‘Paletwa region’ from the hands of the military council. During a press conference on March 4, U Khaing Thukha, the spokesperson for the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), stated that in the Paletwa region, the United League of Arakan (ULA) would operate its ‘administrative mechanisms with the participation of local people.’ Following this statement, such criticisms and attacks intensified even further.
These criticisms and attacks primarily stem from the perspectives of certain Chin political groups and individuals who either dislike or disapprove of the ULA/AA, or who have no connection to the ULA/AA’s interests. It is evident that this is the case. After the Arakan Army fully seized the Paletwa region, the local people there have increasingly experienced security and stability. If, in the future, a more peaceful and stable political environment can be established, along with the effective implementation of border trade, there is a strong possibility that within a suitable timeframe, the region could develop and prosper significantly.
Original Owners
In the present era, the Paletwa region is home to numerous ethnic groups such as the Khumi, Mro, Arakanese, Khaungso, Anu, and Mara, among others. It is said that in urban areas, the ‘Arakanese language’ is primarily spoken as the common language (lingua franca). Additionally, Paletwa has relatively easy water and land transportation routes connecting it to Arakan, Kyauktaw Township, and along the Kaladan River.
The geographical location, political history, and administrative background of the Paletwa region are inseparable from Arakan. Geographically speaking, the hills, mountains, streams, and lakes that constitute the Paletwa region are rooted in the ‘Arakan Yoma’ (Arakan Mountain Range) and the ‘Kaladan River,’ also known as ‘Kissapanadi.’
Historically, according to the ancient chronicles of the Arakanese People, the Paletwa region was the site where King Marayu established the ‘First Dyanyawaddy City-State.’ It is said that the name ‘Paletwa’ derives from the Arakanese term ‘Palinwa.’ Furthermore, over successive eras, the Paletwa region existed under the governance of Arakanese kingdoms for over a thousand years, with stronger evidence emerging by the time of the Mrauk-U period. During the Mrauk-U era, under the administrative structure of the Arakanese Kingdom, the region was designated as ‘U-Thalin Province’ based on the ‘U-Thalin Pagoda,’ built and revered by King Thuriyasakka (316–272 BC) during the Third Dhanyawaddy period. Given these historical records and other substantial supporting evidence, it is undeniable that the Paletwa region has consistently been under the sovereign authority of Arakanese kings throughout history.
In reality, the ‘Khumi’ ethnic group, which currently forms the largest population in the Paletwa region, is believed to have arrived after fleeing southward due to military defeats by the ‘Lai’ ethnic subgroups from the north. Traditionally, historical records claim that the tribal chiefs of Khumi community paid regular tributes to the Arakanese kings in Mrauk-U. Arakanese chronicles also expressed the ownership of Paletwa region along the Kaladan river.
Later, after the fall of Arakan, during the resistance against the Burmese kings’ invasion of Arakanese, the Paletwa chief, Bo San, also fought in the revolution. Arakanese rebels, too, took refuge in the Paletwa region while resisting the Burmese forces.
In truth, the identity of ‘Chin’ primarily emerged as an ‘imposed and collective identity’ defined externally during British colonial rule. The concept of ‘Chin State’ was based more on geographical continuity than on a politically constructed entity. At the same time, even after the British government occupied all of Myanmar, the Paletwa region was designated and governed as part of the ‘Arakan Hill Tract’ rather than the Chin Hills region. This continued until the pre-independence period under U Nu’s government in 1952, when it was incorporated into the ‘Chin Special Division.’ Before the emergence of Arakan, it remained a part of Arakan Division.
The Contrasting Backgrounds of Political Development Between Chin and Arakanese
In the current context of armed political developments, there exists a stark and evident difference between the two neighboring ‘states’ of Chin and Arakanese. This difference lies between the ‘weak centralized political structure of Chin’ and the ‘strongly centralized political structure of Arakanese.’ Within Chin State, apart from the long-standing revolutionary organization known as the ‘Chin National Front (CNF),’ there have emerged, following the 2021 military coup, at least over 20 separate groups based on tribes, townships, or regions. It is also clearly observable that the vast majority of these groups prefer to stand independently and equally rather than under the leadership or governance of the CNF who based in the northern Haka and Falam ‘Lai’ ethnic communities. The emergence of differing perspectives regarding the Chinland Council, formed under CNF leadership a few months ago, is not merely a coincidence. Similarly, groups like the ‘Chin Brotherhood,’ established in parallel to the Chinland Council, possess strong support among their respective Chin communities, as well as military and political resources. Based on the socio-cultural and economic foundations of the Chin Hills, it is partially understood that some believe a ‘Confederated States of Chinland’ would be more suitable.
While Chin State faces such circumstances, a contrasting political development is observed in neighboring Arakan. Over the past decade or so, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) has emerged as the sole political force capable of surpassing all pre-existing political organizations and unifying the representation and support of the entire Arakanese populace.
The emergence of these two distinct political landscapes in Chin and Arakan is not merely due to short-term or superficial causes. Rather, it is deeply tied to political developments spanning centuries and millennia. In other words, a unified political entity has been the ‘default system’ of Arakan’s political history, which stretches back thousands of years, while Chin State’s political history has existed in the opposite manner.
For any ethnic group or political entity in the world to reach the level of a ‘state,’ it must pass through three stages: 1) the band level, 2) the tribe level, and 3) the chiefdom level. The Arakanese People, over thousands and hundreds of years, successfully progressed to the ‘state’ level by establishing city-states and kingdoms. In contrast, until the British colonial government occupied Myanmar, the Chin people remained at the tribe and chiefdom levels, progressing separately without ever developing a ‘united and centralized system.’ This means that, unlike the Arakanese, the Chin never established a ‘Chin city-state’ or ‘Chin kingdom.’ Likewise, throughout its millennia-long history, the ‘Paletwa region’ was never part of any Chin political entity. Instead, it remained under the governance of Arakanese city-states and kingdoms, a fact that stands out clearly.
Reasons for Ownership
In the current period, the debate over who should rightfully own the Paletwa region between the Chin and Arakanese appears to be primarily based on two key points for each side. The Chin perspective is grounded in: 1) the fact that Paletwa has been located within Chin State since independence and up to the present day, and 2) the cultural affiliation of the Khumi ethnic group in Paletwa, who are considered part of the Chin lineage. On the other hand, the Arakanese perspective rests on: 1) the current reality that the Arakan Army (AA) has sacrificed numerous lives, blood, and sweat to seize and possess Paletwa, and 2) the historical fact that Paletwa has been an integral part of Arakan for centuries, if not millennia.
In other words, the Chin narrative’s two main foundations are based on de jure ownership (legal claim) and cultural affiliation, while the Arakanese narrative’s two main foundations are rooted in de facto ownership (practical control) and political-historical ownership.
When comparing these two foundational points from each side, it becomes evident that the Chin narrative’s arguments contain vulnerabilities, weaknesses, and inconsistencies. First, if the Chin claim Paletwa based on legal ownership (de jure), they must clarify what legal framework establishes this legitimacy. In the current context, following the military coup, the 2008 Constitution has been rejected by groups including the National Unity Government (NUG) and various Chin armed factions, rendering any claim of legality under the 2008 Constitution invalid. Meanwhile, neither the NUG nor any Chin political or armed groups have legally established Paletwa as a part of Chin State. Furthermore, since Paletwa is not a sovereign entity under international law, its legal status cannot be defined through international legal frameworks either. Thus, the Chin narrative’s de jure basis lacks strength and cannot be considered robust. Second, regarding cultural affiliation, if Paletwa is claimed as part of Chin State due to cultural ties, a key question arises: among the diverse ethnic subgroups such as ‘Lai,’ ‘Zo,’ and ‘Mindat,’ to which group’s cultural identity does the Khumi belong? A critical point here is that the Khumi’s ethnic nationalism does not consistently align with that of the ‘Lai,’ ‘Zo,’ or others. More importantly, Paletwa is not exclusively a Khumi domain; it is a region where multiple ethnic groups, including Mro, Mara, and Arakanese, coexist. If cultural affiliations were sufficient to determine political ownership, it could lead to numerous disputes within Myanmar alone, and globally, wars—both large and small—would never cease.
While the Chin narrative exhibits such weaknesses, the Arakanese narrative’s two foundational points stand far more robustly, leaving little room for dispute. The first of these is de facto ownership. In the present context, the Arakan Army has fought and seized the Paletwa region—previously under the Myanmar military’s Western Regional Military Command—with immense sacrifices of life, blood, and sweat. Consequently, any revolutionary group or ethnicity that pays such a heavy price should rightfully enjoy the fruits of their victory. It is worth noting here that de facto ownership—practical control—carries a higher principled weight than de jure ownership (normative claim). A prominent example of this is the Chinese Civil War, where, in 1949, the Communist Red Army defeated the Kuomintang Nationalist forces, leading to the emergence of two competing governments representing China in the international community. The Communist government was the de facto authority, while the Kuomintang was the de jure government. However, the Communist government, which exercised practical control over mainland China, was recognized as the legitimate government of China. Over time, the international community—including Western governments—gradually transferred recognition of China’s UN Security Council veto power from the Taipei (Taiwan) government to the Beijing government. This example illustrates that, in the long term, who effectively controls and governs a territory is a more decisive factor.
The second point of the Arakanese narrative regarding Paletwa’s ownership is equally significant from the perspective of legitimacy. Historically, over the past 1,000 years, 500 years, or 100 years, Paletwa has consistently been part of Arakanese kingdoms established by the Arakanese People. Over 200 years ago, the Arakanese lost their centralized authority with the fall of their dynasty, enduring Burmese invasions, British colonial rule, and Japanese fascist oppression. Even after Myanmar’s independence in 1948, they remained a people and territory without self-governance or autonomy, forced into a diminished existence. Concurrently, the territories they once possessed gradually eroded, shrinking to the size of a “lotus pond and lotus leaf”. Now, under the leadership of the Arakan Army, with national unity and military and political victories, their desire to reclaim and redefine their ancestral lands is an entirely natural and just demand.
In contemporary international relations, the Arakanese case with Paletwa mirrors—albeit on a different scale—the Chinese case with Taiwan in terms of the underlying phenomenon. According to the Chinese perspective, Taiwan has been under the rule of successive Chinese dynasties throughout history. However, starting in the late 19th century, due to invasions by advanced powers like Japan and the West, China was fragmented “like a melon being sliced,” resulting in the loss of territories. Chinese scholars and people refer to this period—from the end of the First Opium War in 1842 to the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949—as the “century of national humiliation.”
Today, as China grows stronger, it seeks to rectify these losses, viewing the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland as a major national issue. Under the “One China Principle,” over 90% of more than 190 countries worldwide recognize Taiwan as part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), increasingly severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Similarly, just as China’s growing strength has led the international community to accept Taiwan as part of China, Arakanese’s resurgence after “over 200 years of national humiliation” suggests that Paletwa should be recognized as part of Arakan under a “Reunification of Arakan.” This consideration is of utmost importance.
The Future of Paletwa
In the current period, the Paletwa region, where the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) is enhancing its administrative and judicial mechanisms, enjoys greater stability and security compared to other regions, with promising prospects for development. If the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, spearheaded by the Indian government, and cross-border trade initiatives gain further momentum, the residents of Paletwa will be among the first to reap the benefits of these developments. The policies established by the ULA government regarding Paletwa are designed to prevent ‘the strong oppressing the weak’ among the region’s diverse ethnic and religious communities. Instead, they aim to ensure that Paletwa’s residents actively participate in and lead the administrative and judicial systems themselves. The future of Paletwa cannot be separated from the future of Arakan as a whole. In a strong, prosperous, and developed future Arakan, the role of Paletwa’s residents will always remain significant, holding a prioritized and critical position.
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